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A Comparison and Decomposition of Reform-Era Labor Force 
Participation Rates of China’s Ethnic Minorities and Han Majority 
 
This paper examines differences in China’s ethnic majority and minority patterns of labor 
force participation and decomposes these differences into treatment and endowment effects 
using the technique developed by Borooah and Iyer (2005). Population census data are used 
to estimate gender-separated urban labor force participation rates (lfpr) using logit 
regressions which control for educational attainment, marital status, pre-school and school-
age children, household size, age, and measures of local economic conditions. We focus on 
six minority groups (Hui, Koreans, Manchu, Mongolians, Uygurs, and Zhuang) and the 
majority Han. We find sizable differences between the lfpr of urban women of particular 
ethnic groups and the majority Han. Men’s lfpr are very high and exhibit little difference 
between Han and ethnic minorities. For almost all pair-wise comparisons between Han and 
minority women, we find that differences in coefficients account for more than 100% of the 
Han-ethnic difference in labor force participation. Differences in endowments often have 
substantial effects in reducing this positive Han margin in labor force participation. Roughly 
speaking, treatment of women’s characteristics, whether in the market or socially, tend to 
increase the Han advantage in labor force participation. The levels of these characteristics on 
average tend to reduce this Han advantage. 
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 “All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal.… Discrimination 
against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited….” (Article 4 of the 




This paper contributes to the scant literature on ethnicity in China’s economic 
transition. In the late 1970s the Chinese leadership embarked on a program of 
economic reform which initiated a transition to a market economy.  At the national 
level, the transition led to rapid and sustained income growth and welfare 
improvements. Less is known about how China’s different ethnic groups have fared in 
the reform process. The aim of this paper is to fill part of the gap. 
2.  China’s Ethnic Minorities 
According to China’s 2000 population census, 8.5 % of the Chinese 
population (106 million people) was classified as ethnic minority. When we use the 
terms ethnic minority, national minority or minority people here we are referring to 
the 55 national minorities that, with the Han majority, make up the 56 ethnic groups 
officially recognized by the Chinese central government. Chinese policies towards 
ethnic minorities stem in part from a legacy inherited from dynastic leaders, in part 
from an ethnic identification project built on Stalinist principles and implemented in 
the early years of the People’s Republic, and in part from an array of adaptations to 
specific local situations. In the mid-1980s, government policy increased the benefits 
to minority identification
1 and thus provided an incentive for change in ethnic 
identity.  Consequently, when on the basis of fertility trends an increase of 10 million 
                                                 
1 The government’s preferential policies include an exemption from, or easing of, the restrictions of the 
government’s family planning program, as well as preferential treatment in school admissions, hiring 
and promotion, the financing and taxation of businesses and the provision of infrastructure (Sautman, 
p.86). Whether and how these policies are implemented is an important issue. was expected, the actual number of people self- identifying as ethnic minorities in the 
1990 census increased by 24 million.
2   
Much of China’s total land area (63.9 percent), particularly the politically 
sensitive border regions in northwestern, southwestern, and northeastern China, is 
designated as autonomous ethnic minority regions (State Ethnic Affairs Committee 
(SEAC) 2003: 545), and many of China’s minority people (75 percent) reside in these 
specially designated areas (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China 1999: 15). Published economic statistical data on China’s minority 
peoples is almost always presented by autonomous region rather than by ethnic 
group.
3 This makes it difficult to shed light on questions about the economic well-
being of China’s minority peoples since the Han often comprise a significant 
proportion of the population in autonomous regions.
4  
Overall economic indicators show a rising standard of living in ethnic 
minority regions. Colin Mackerras (2003: 56–76) examines numerous indicators of 
the standard of living in China’s minority areas, including measure of rural income, 
wages, healthcare provision, infrastructure development, and industrial development, 
concluding that since 1990 minorities have radically improved their standard of 
living. However, these improvements have not kept pace with developments in the 
                                                 
2 The Manchu and Tujia populations increased particularly rapidly between the 1982 and 1990 
censuses. 
3 See for example China’s Yearbook of Ethnic Works (SEAC 2003), China’s Ethnic Statistical 
Yearbook (State Ethnic Affairs Committee, Department of Economic Development, and National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, PRC Department of Integrated Statistics 2000), and the Statistical 
Yearbooks of China (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2005). Katherine Palmer Kaup (2000: 149) 
suggests that the income inequalities between ethnic groups are so pronounced that if published would 
become a very contentious issue. 
4 For example, in 2002, the minority population of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region 
constituted only 20.9 percent of its total population. Comparable figures for Guangxi Zhuang and the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions are 38.4 percent and 35.4 percent, respectively. Tibet and Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Regions are notable exceptions, with the minority populations constituting 96.7 
and 60.1 percent of their respective populations (NBS and SEAC 2003: 564, Tables 2–8). national economy. China’s minorities dwell predominately in western China, a region 
that includes China’s poorest provinces and lags far behind the eastern seaboard 
provinces in terms of income and economic development.   
Socioeconomic treatises on China’s ethnic groups (as opposed to autonomous 
regions) are rare. One notable exception is the work of Gustafsson and Li who make 
an important contribution to the economic literature about China’s minority 
nationalities. They employ survey data gathered in 1988 and 1995 from 19 provinces, 
to assess the differences in rural income between the Han majority and ethnic 
minorities (grouped together). They find that the per capita income gap of 19.2% in 
the earlier period grew to 35.9% in the latter period. When they decompose the 
income differential into differences due to endowments and treatment they find that 
the lion’s share of the differential is due to differences in endowments and that 
minority incomes are lower than Han incomes largely due to location. They note that 
China’s minorities are clustered in provinces with low per capital GDP and tend to 
dwell in mountainous areas and areas officially designated as poor.  
Gustaffson and Ding build on this earlier work, employing survey data from 
22 provinces gathered in 2002 to analyze differences between ethnic minority people 
(grouped together) and majority people in the levels of temporary and persistent 
poverty in rural China. They too argue that poverty in rural China has a very strong 
spatial dimension—that ethnic minorities have higher rates of both persistent and 
temporary poverty because minorities are concentrated in western China, home to 
most of China’s poor. They find that the rates of poverty differ little between 
minorities and the majority in western China. They report that factors such as the 
education level of the household head, village mean income, and whether the village is located in a mountainous area are much more important than ethnicity in explaining 
poverty and that ethnic minority status has little independent effect. 
Hannum and Xie, in another important contribution to this literature, focus on 
an array of particular minorities in a single province. They employ population census 
data to examine the effects of market reform on differences in occupational attainment 
of Xinjiang’s (mainly Turkic) minorities in comparison to the Han. Hannum and Xie 
find that the ethnic gap in occupational attainment between the Han and the minorities 
widened between the 1982 and 1990 censuses. They attribute the rising gap to an 
increased gap in educational attainment between the Han and the minorities and a 
strengthening of the relationship between educational attainment and higher-status 
occupations.  
Ding and Li analyze income inequality and differences in income 
determination for Hui and Han urban residents in Ningxia based on survey data 
gathered in 2007. They decompose differences in earnings into treatment and 
endowment effects and find that the treatment effects are more important than 
endowment effects in explaining the incomes differences between the Hui and Han. It 
is important to note, however, that the treatment effects do not necessarily favor the 
Han. Ding and Li report that returns to education are somewhat higher for the Han 
than the Hui, while the returns to experience are higher for the Hui than the Han. 
Similarly, party membership favors (has a bigger return for) the Hui while state 
ownership of the workplace favors the Han. Maurer-Fazio, Hughes, and Zhang (2007) 
analyze trends in the labor force participation of China’s minorities between 1990 and 
2000. They find that minorities were affected more adversely than Han by reductions 
in urban sector employment and exited the labor force more rapidly than Han. The papers of Gustafsson and Li and Hannum and Xie suggest that minorities 
have not fared well in China’s transition—that both rural income and occupational 
attainment gaps between minorities and the Han have widened. The former paper 
argues that location rather than ethnicity is the causal factor in the widening rural 
income gap while the latter paper suggests that important ethnic differences in labor 
market outcomes remain even after carefully controlling for location.  Similarly, 
Gustaffson and Ding argue that rural poverty is better explained by location rather 
than ethnicity while Ding and Li find ethnicity a significant factor in urban income 
determination.  
This nascent but growing literature on ethnicity in China’s transition has 
addressed rural and urban income, rural poverty, and occupational attainment and 
touched on urban labor force participation. We add to this literature by deepening the 
analysis of the labor force participation of a number of China’s important ethnic 
groups. We expand on the earlier analysis of Maurer-Fazio, Hughes, and Zhang in 
several significant ways. First, we extend the time period from 1982 to 2000 and 
include a larger set of ethnic minorities. More importantly, we control for both 
demographic factors and local economic conditions. We are particularly interested in 
whether the differences in majority and minority economic labor force participation 
rates are mainly attributable to differences in ethnic groups’ attributes or the treatment 
of those attributes.  
3. Research  Strategy 
 
We utilize the method developed by Borooah and Iyer (2005) to decompose 
differences in labor force participation rates between the Han majority and a number 
of minorities into coefficient and attribute effects. The Borooah Iyer model extends the well-known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to logit models and, 
importantly for our case, allows the inclusion of multiple groups.  Our analysis is 
based on the data of the 1982, 1990, and 2000 population censuses of China which 
identify individuals’ ethnic status and allow us to overcome some of the above-
mentioned data scarcity problems.  
We focus our analysis on the labor force participation patterns of urban 
residents.
5 We concentrate on six important minority groups and the Han majority. 
The limited number of urban ethnic minority residents in the census samples 
determined which groups we could include in our analysis. We’ve included every 
minority group with sufficient sample size to successfully run (with a consistent set of 
explanatory variables) the logits which underlie the Borooah Iyer method.  We thus 
carry out pair wise comparisons of the differences in labor force participation between 
the Han and Hui, Koreans, Manchu, Mongolians, Uygurs, and Zhuang.
6  
We divide our samples by gender and separately analyze men’s and women’s 
labor force participation. Men’s labor force participation rates for both majority and 
minority men are extremely high in international perspective. Since there is very little 
difference by ethnicity between men’s labor force participation rates, we have 
relegated the men’s analysis to Appendix Tables 1 and 2. In the following sections of 
this paper, we focus our analysis and discussion on the differences in women’s labor 
force participation. 
                                                 
5 Chinese population census questionnaires do not include any questions about income.  
6 The Zhuang have the largest population amongst China’s minorities. They reside in the southwestern 
China. The Mongolian and Uygur populations are geographically concentrated in politically sensitive 
areas in northern and northwestern China.  The Hui and Uygurs are Muslim minorities. The Hui are 
broadly dispersed through China. The high education levels and older age structure of the Koreans 
make them quite distinct. Both the Koreans and Manchu reside in northeastern China. In the next section we discuss our theoretical predictions about how the 
reforms might influence labor force participation rates.  The following section 
describes the data used in this project. We then report estimates of urban labor force 
participation rates using logit regressions on the 1982, 1990, and 2000 data. These 
regressions controls for ethnic group, educational attainment, marital status, 
household composition, age, and local economic conditions and allow us to determine 
whether the participation rates of particular ethnic groups differ from that of the Han 
majority and whether there are any discernible trends in such differences over time. 
We then employ the Borooah Iyer technique to decompose the differences in labor 
force participation into treatment/coefficient and attribute/endowment effect. We 
summarize our findings in the final section of the paper. 
4.  Labor Force Participation Rates   
China’s economic reforms have widened the range of women’s opportunities 
for paid employment as the economic structure shifted away from capital-intensive 
heavy industry towards labor-intensive light industry and commercial services. 
Economic growth and concomitant wage increases raise the opportunity cost of not 
working.  On this basis, we’d expect to see higher levels of labor force participation in 
1990 and 2000 than in 1982, as the gains from such participation increase. China, 
however, has long had very high labor force participation rates by international 
standards, especially for women. The labor force participation rates of urban women in 
1982 (very early in the reform period) were 87.5 for women age 25-50 and 70.5 for 
women age 15 and above.
7 Thus, economic growth may not draw significant numbers 
                                                 
7 Authors’ calculations based on the census data. of new workers into the labor force, as not many adults were outside the labor force in 
the pre-reform period.  
The transition also created new obstacles for women’s labor force participation. 
The state’s retreat from its commitment to socialist ideology and enforcement of 
workplace protections for women coincided with a reemergence of traditional 
patriarchal values (Croll, 1995; Entwisle and Henderson, 2000). This retreat combined 
with growing pressure to reduce the size of the state-owned enterprise work force put 
pressure on women, especially older women, to leave the labor force and return to 
more subordinate roles.  In many cases, the effort expenditure required at the 
workplace increased with reform-era changes in workplace discipline, making it more 
difficult for working women to cope with household responsibilities and thus raising 
the costs of labor force participation, particularly for married women with young 
children.  We thus add variables to control for the number of children of various age 
groups. 
At the household level, rising incomes of spouses and/or other household 
members can be viewed as an income effect for married women that would allow some 
individuals to withdraw from the labor force when their spouses’ earnings met 
household income goals.  Labor force participation of married women could decline as 
a result of this phenomenon. Such a trend, however, might be dampened by China’s 
birth planning policies, implemented first as the wan xi shao policy (later births, longer 
intervals, fewer children) in 1971 and followed by the even more stringent “one-child” 
policy of 1979, which drastically reduced total fertility rates and affected the value of 
time spent in home production. The vast majority of Chinese women continue to marry and to raise children but they have far fewer children and are finished with 
childbearing and childrearing at earlier ages than their mothers and grandmothers. 
Education is increasingly rewarded in the Chinese workplace (Maurer-Fazio 
1999, Zhang et. al. 2005). We, thus, expect to observe a positive relationship between 
level of education and labor force participation.   
The restructuring of the state-owned sector in the latter half of the 1990s led to 
the lay off of many millions of urban workers. Extended periods of lay off led, in turn, 
to withdrawal from the labor force of some of these workers, the discouraged worker 
effect.  The layoffs appeared to fall disproportionately on women and older workers 
(Giles, Park, and Cai, 2006; and Maurer-Fazio, 2006).  We enter a series of age 
dummies to allow for changing age effects.  
Finally, and importantly for the focus of this paper, with a relaxation of the 
protections afforded workers in the socialist period, managers may have begun to 
indulge prejudices against particular ethnic groups by refusing to hire or 
disproportionately laying off members of these groups.  If such practices are 
widespread, members of disadvantaged groups could become ‘discouraged workers’ 
and withdraw from the labor force.  
5.  Data Description  
The data employed in this project are drawn from the three most recent 
population censuses of China. Our analysis is based on one percent micro data 
samples of the 1982 and 1990 censuses and a 0.095 percent micro data sample of the 
2000 census.
8 We use all the data for urban residents available in the 1982 and 2000 
                                                 
8 1982 and 1990 samples were obtained from the Data User Services of China Population Information 
and Research Center. census micro samples and take a random 50% subsample of the urban residents in the 
1990 micro sample. 
Individuals are considered to be in the labor force if they had a job on the day 
of the census or if they were unemployed and looking for work at that time.  We 
equate those classified as “waiting for work” in the earlier censuses as seeking 
employment and thus part of the labor force.  
Ethnicity is reported directly on the census questionnaires. The number of 
ethnic groups is consistent across all 3 censuses. We restrict the ages of the 
individuals included in our analysis to those between 25 and 50. The lower age bound 
allows us to focus our analysis on those who have completed their schooling. The 
upper bound is prescribed by two factors. First, and importantly, the Chinese 
population census data reports household relationships relative to the household head. 
This makes it very difficult to accurately assign dependent children to parents in 
multi-generation, extended households. To reliably sort out which children belong to 
which adults in the census households we make use of a set of questions related to 
fertility that is asked only of women aged 15 to 50.
9 Secondly, women who are 
considered “ordinary” workers face a retirement age of 50. 
For each person in our census samples, we have created a set of variables that 
characterize ethnicity, the number of adults in the household, the age distribution of 
children in the household, marital status,
10 education,
11 and age.  
                                                 
9 In 1982 and 1990 this set of questions was asked of women age 15 to 64 but in 2000 it was asked only 
of women age 15 to 50. 
10 We control not only for marital status but also whether the spouse of a married individual was 
considered a member of the individual’s household for the census enumeration. In 1982 and 1990, 
individuals away from their registered (hukou) residence for a year or more were enumerated at their 
then-current location. In 2000, individuals away from their registered residence for 6 months or more 
were enumerated at their then-current location. We also created a set of variables at the prefecture and provincial levels that 
capture local economic conditions—provincial per capital urban income, provincial 
real GDP growth rates over the previous 5 years, and prefectural unemployment 
rates.
12  These variables are intended to capture differences in labor market 
opportunities and the general health of the local economy.
13   
 
6.  Results and Discussion 
We first estimate logits on labor force participation for 1982, 1990, and 2000 
with controls for ethnic group, educational attainment, marital status, household 
composition, age, and local economic conditions.  The results are presented in Tables 
1A, 1B, and 1C. The base case consists of married Han of age category 25 to 29 with 
junior middle-school education. All explanatory variables are highly significant save 
for one or two ethnic group indicators in particular years, 
Focusing first on the ethnic group indicators, we see that while in 1982 and 
1990 Hui and Korean women had labor force participation rates that were 
indistinguishable from the Han, this changes over the course of the reforms. By 2000, 
Hui and Korean women, respectively, were 3.5 and 5.5% less likely to participate in 
the labor force than Han women. (See Column 4--Marginal Probabilities in Tables 
1A-C.)
14 The vast majority of Koreans live in northeastern China, an area hit hard by 
                                                                                                                                            
11 We aggregate educational classifications into four categories that are consistent across the census 
years: primary or less, junior middle school, senior middle school, and post-secondary education. 
12 Prefectures are the administrative units below provinces and above counties. 
13 Provincial per capita urban income was obtained through China Statistical Yearbooks accessed 
through China Data Online (NBS). The growth rates of annual GDP over the previous five years were 
obtained through a compendium of GDP statistics released by National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 
2004). The prefectural unemployment rate was calculated from the census data itself by aggregating 
unemployment information for all prefectural residents. 
14 For binary variables, the table entries in the marginal probability column represent the discrete 
change in probability as the binary independent variable is toggled from zero to one.  For continuous 
variables such as age, the table entries are the change in the probability of labor force participation the decline of inefficient State-run enterprises. Korean men and women both exhibit 
steeper declines in participation rates than any other ethnic group studied here. 
In 1982 and 1990, Manchu, Mongolian, Uygur women were significantly less 
likely to be in the labor force than Han women. By 2000, the Manchu women became 
indistinguishable from Han in terms of labor force participation. The very large gap 
between Uygur and Han participation in 1982 (21.4%) was reduced to 12.6% by 1990 
and remained at 12% through 2000.  
The Zhuang are the only ethnic group with labor force participation rates 
substantially and significantly higher than that of the Han. Throughout the whole 
period, Zhuang women’s participation rates remained 7.4 to 7.9% above that of the 
Han. 
As expected, education became an increasingly important determinant of labor 
force participation. At the beginning of the period, women with post-secondary 
educations were 6.6% more likely to be in the labor force than those with junior 
middle-school educations. By the end of the period, those with post-secondary 
education were 21.2% more likely to be in the labor force. Throughout the period, 
women with pre-school age children were consistently 4 to 5% less likely to be in the 
labor force than others.  
Women’s labor force participation is inversely related to local unemployment 
rates (suggesting a discouraged-worker effect) and, generally, positively related to the 
level of provincial urban income and provincial rates of GDP growth. The sample 
statistics presented in Tables 2A-C reveal a marked decline in urban women’s labor 
                                                                                                                                            
resulting from a one unit change in the independent variable.  All probabilities are calculated at the 
sample means. force participation between 1990 and 2000 which is not mirrored in the sample 
statistics for men (Appendix Tables 1A-C).  
To better understand whether the differences between Han and ethnic minority 
participation rates are due to differences in their endowments (education level, marital 
status, household composition, age structure, and location) or to the coefficients 
(responses to or treatment) of those attributes, we use the Borooah Iyer decomposition 
technique. Its coefficient effect is derived by estimating the participation rate that 
would arise if all the women in the sample were treated as Han and subtracting from 
this the participation rate that would arise if all women in the sample were treated as 
one of the ethnic groups, for example, Manchu. Borooah and Iyer refer to this as the 
difference in synthetic probabilities, or in our case, the difference in synthetic 
participation rates. The endowment effect is the difference in Han and Manchu 
participation rates resulting from Han Manchu differences in attributes when 
evaluated with a common coefficient vector. We estimate the endowment effect by 
subtracting the difference in Han and Manchu synthetic participation rates from the 
difference between the actual, observed Han and Manchu participation rates. 
In the labor force participation setting, we interpret the coefficient effect to 
measure the “return,” or “treatment” of women’s average characteristics.  If all 
women had Han average attributes rather than, say Uygur attributes, how would the 
difference in labor force participation change?  We note that this treatment of 
attributes could be market based (e.g., different returns to education) or cultural (e.g. 
different attitudes towards market and home production).  The attributes effect in our 
model is broader than in earnings models, as it includes local economic factors in addition to personal attributes.  Thus, differences in local unemployment rates are part 
of the attribute effect. 
We present pair-wise decompositions for Han and minority women in Table 3 
(and Han and minority men in Appendix Table 2). The coefficient effects clearly 
outweigh the attribute effects in all of our pair-wise comparisons. (The two exceptions 
are the Han Hui 1982 and 1990 cases -- where Han Hui differences in participation 
rates are quite trivial, less than one percentage point.)   A coefficient effect over 100% 
indicates that if all women had Han rather than minority group attributes, the higher 
labor for participation rate for the Han would be higher still.  Han women attributes—
whether it is easier to get a job due to employers favoring Han, or, it is easier to get a 
job because Han women are concentrated in lower unemployment regions—
encourage Han labor force participation. 
The attribute effects are mostly negative, indicating that differences in average 
Han and minority personal and economic characteristics tend to reduce the gap 
between Han and minority labor force participation.  The reason for such negative 
attribute effects could be differences in numbers of young children at home, making 
labor force participation more difficult, or, minorities could be concentrated in higher 
unemployment regions, leading discouraged minority workers to drop out of the labor 
force in greater proportion to the majority Han.   
Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish here between positive cultural attitudes 
and effects of potential employer discrimination. As discussed above, if employers 
discriminate against minorities in hiring and layoff decisions, minorities may become 
discouraged workers and drop out of the labor force at rates above that of the Han. Of 
the groups studied here, Zhuang women alone seem more disposed to participate in the labor force than the Han. Their actual rates of participation exceed those of the 
Han from 6.4 to 9.2 percentage points. The gaps between the observed participation 
rates of Han and Manchu, Mongolian and, most notably, Uygur women have 
narrowed over time. Although we may be tempted to speculate whether the attitudes 
of Han women have changed in ways that make them relatively less inclined to 
participate or the minorities more inclined to participate, or whether market forces 
have mitigated manager’s potential inclination to discriminate against minorities, the 
data we are working with don’t allow us to distinguish between these factors.  
6. Concluding  Comments 
  The decision to enter the paid workforce or to engage in home production is a 
complex combination of economic, social and cultural forces.  China’s economic 
reforms have unleashed changes in all of these factors.  Rewards to market work have 
increased with reform for most Chinese women, but re-emergent pre-socialist 
concepts of gender roles may encourage woman to forego these rewards in favor of 
home production.  Our analysis yields indications that market and social treatment of 
Han attributes tend to ease women’s entry into the labor force, while minority women 
appear to be rich in levels of those attributes that discourage market work at the 
margin.  Further research is needed to separate the varied influences determining the 
labor force decisions of Chinese women.References 
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 Data Sources for Tables:  1% Micro samples of the Population Censuses of China for 




Hui 0.049 0.056 0.880 0.004 0.013
Korean 0.192 0.109 1.770 0.015 0.004
Manchu -0.442 0.081 -5.480 -0.043 0.005
Mongolian -0.804 0.123 -6.550 -0.091 0.002
Uygur -1.487 0.094 -15.850 -0.214 0.003
Zhuang 1.793 0.159 11.280 0.074 0.003
other ethnic minorities 1.171 0.125 9.370 0.061 0.005
 Educational Attainment
primary school or less -0.771 0.016 -48.740 -0.077 0.199
base case: junior middle school
senior middle school 1.309 0.034 38.230 0.075 0.139
post-secondary education 1.318 0.070 18.890 0.066 0.029
 Marital Status
not married -0.058 0.031 -1.920 -0.005 0.066
base case: married spouse present
married spouse elsewhere -0.183 0.019 -9.450 -0.016 0.166
 Household Composition
Number of adults (age 18 and over) -0.087 0.006 -15.300 -0.007 2.759
number of children age 0 to 5 -0.470 0.014 -33.280 -0.039 0.421
number of children age 6 to12 -0.146 0.009 -16.160 -0.012 0.678
number of children age 13 to 17 0.063 0.017 3.800 0.005 0.305
 Age Category
base case: age 25 to 29
age 30 to 34 0.092 0.023 3.940 0.007 0.216
age 35 to 39 -0.215 0.029 -7.530 -0.019 0.160
age 40 to 44 -0.614 0.028 -22.230 -0.060 0.161
age 45 to 50 -1.762 0.025 -71.170 -0.228 0.181
 Economic Environment
prefectural unemployment rate  -0.221 0.006 -38.490 -0.018 1.577
provincial real per capita income 0.112 0.003 35.350 0.009 10.168
provincial real 5-year GDP growth 0.123 0.004 28.030 0.010 9.158





Number of observations 245,402
Wald chi2(23)   = 23,942
Prob > chi2     = 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.149
Labor Force Participation of Chinese Urban Women, Age 25-50, in 1982
Table 1-A
Logistic Regressions and Marginal Effects
Variables Coefficient
Robust 






Hui 0.095 0.056 1.710 0.008 0.010
Korean -0.084 0.098 -0.850 -0.008 0.003
Manchu -0.683 0.045 -15.190 -0.080 0.010
Mongolian -1.096 0.065 -16.810 -0.150 0.005
Uygur -0.965 0.066 -14.530 -0.126 0.004
Zhuang 1.535 0.089 17.180 0.079 0.011
other ethnic minorities -0.034 0.047 -0.730 -0.003 0.015
 Educational Attainment
primary school or less -0.546 0.015 -35.780 -0.059 0.115
base case: junior middle school
senior middle school 1.276 0.020 64.150 0.091 0.236
post-secondary education 2.653 0.081 32.580 0.102 0.040
 Marital Status
not married 0.133 0.031 4.220 0.011 0.042
base case: married spouse present
married spouse elsewhere -0.025 0.022 -1.130 -0.002 0.085
 Household Composition
Number of adults (age 18 and over) -0.040 0.005 -7.290 -0.004 2.620
number of children age 0 to 5 -0.410 0.011 -37.550 -0.037 0.405
number of children age 6 to12 -0.235 0.010 -24.460 -0.021 0.534
number of children age 13 to 17 -0.143 0.015 -9.720 -0.013 0.249
 Age Category
base case: age 25 to 29
age 30 to 34 0.174 0.020 8.610 0.015 0.224
age 35 to 39 0.153 0.022 6.910 0.013 0.222
age 40 to 44 -0.320 0.024 -13.550 -0.032 0.155
age 45 to 50 -1.295 0.022 -58.880 -0.169 0.140
 Economic Environment
prefectural unemployment rate  -0.250 0.004 -65.030 -0.023 1.269
provincial real per capita income 0.015 0.000 34.480 0.001 55.606
provincial real 5-year GDP growth -0.067 0.004 -16.650 -0.006 5.956





Number of observations 303,694
Wald chi2(23)   = 22,900
Prob > chi2     = 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.120
Labor Force Participation of Chinese Urban Women, Age 25-50 in 1990
Table 1-B
Logistic Regressions and Marginal Effects
Variables Coefficient
Robust 






Hui -0.200 0.078 -2.560 -0.035 0.010
Korean -0.304 0.153 -1.980 -0.055 0.003
Manchu 0.001 0.083 0.010 0.000 0.009
Mongolian -0.316 0.114 -2.770 -0.057 0.005
Uygur -0.619 0.122 -5.080 -0.120 0.004
Zhuang 0.563 0.109 5.160 0.079 0.007
other ethnic minorities 0.176 0.071 2.460 0.028 0.015
 Educational Attainment
primary school or less -0.216 0.040 -5.390 -0.038 0.034
base case: junior middle school
senior middle school 0.664 0.021 32.280 0.100 0.251
post-secondary education 2.193 0.052 41.850 0.212 0.099
 Marital Status
not married 0.437 0.041 10.580 0.064 0.057
base case: married spouse present
married spouse elsewhere 0.047 0.034 1.410 0.008 0.071
 Household Composition
Number of adults (age 18 and over) 0.085 0.009 9.370 0.014 2.510
number of children age 0 to 5 -0.302 0.021 -14.160 -0.050 0.225
number of children age 6 to12 -0.043 0.016 -2.710 -0.007 0.410
number of children age 13 to 17 0.115 0.022 5.130 0.019 0.221
 Age Category
base case: age 25 to 29
age 30 to 34 0.080 0.027 2.900 0.013 0.227
age 35 to 39 0.062 0.031 2.000 0.010 0.210
age 40 to 44 -0.208 0.032 -6.480 -0.036 0.166
age 45 to 50 -0.955 0.029 -33.030 -0.184 0.184
 Economic Environment
prefectural unemployment rate  -0.068 0.002 -27.620 -0.011 4.779
provincial real per capita income 0.003 0.000 7.140 0.001 65.563
provincial real 5-year GDP growth 0.068 0.007 9.500 0.011 9.057





Number of observations 93,145
Wald chi2(23)   = 6,183
Prob > chi2     = 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.077
Labor Force Participation of Chinese Urban Women, Age 25-50 in 2000
Table 1-C
Logistic Regressions and Marginal Effects
Variables Coefficient
Robust 





Variable Han Hui Korean Manchu Mongolian Uygur Zhuang
Labor force participation rate 0.873 0.878 0.874 0.803 0.773 0.666 0.937
Education level, proportion with:
primary or less 0.511 0.472 0.277 0.378 0.459 0.637 0.693
junior middle school 0.322 0.370 0.457 0.404 0.257 0.227 0.181
senior middle school 0.139 0.132 0.236 0.183 0.221 0.116 0.112
post secondary  0.029 0.026 0.030 0.035 0.063 0.019 0.015
Marital Status, proportion:
not married 0.066 0.073 0.045 0.071 0.070 0.123 0.063
married, spouse not present 0.167 0.135 0.107 0.136 0.101 0.074 0.166
Household compostion, mean:
number of adults (age 18+) 2.759 2.772 2.884 2.829 2.676 2.645 2.821
number of children age 0 to 5 0.416 0.423 0.421 0.419 0.486 0.750 0.830
number of children age 6 to 12 0.673 0.696 0.614 0.587 0.707 1.114 0.973
number of children age 13 to 17 0.305 0.298 0.322 0.287 0.284 0.394 0.344
Age, proportion this category:
25 to 29 0.283 0.266 0.307 0.309 0.302 0.265 0.300
30 to 34 0.216 0.228 0.203 0.195 0.194 0.191 0.216
 35 to 39 0.160 0.175 0.129 0.137 0.162 0.186 0.144
40 to 44 0.160 0.165 0.168 0.163 0.182 0.170 0.172
45 to 50 0.181 0.166 0.193 0.196 0.160 0.188 0.168
Prefectural Unemployment Rates 1.57% 1.67% 2.44% 2.25% 2.02% 1.11% 2.84%
Number of Observations 236,885 3191 876 1260 444 775 814




  23 
Variable Han Hui Korean Manchu Mongolian Uygur Zhuang
Labor force participation rate 0.866 0.858 0.831 0.770 0.706 0.587 0.957
Education level, proportion with:
primary or less 0.379 0.323 0.178 0.351 0.318 0.465 0.656
junior middle school 0.343 0.393 0.421 0.346 0.310 0.254 0.224
senior middle school 0.238 0.243 0.336 0.254 0.315 0.232 0.114
post secondary  0.040 0.041 0.065 0.049 0.058 0.048 0.006
Marital Status, proportion:
not married 0.040 0.055 0.062 0.035 0.040 0.134 0.060
married, spouse not present 0.086 0.087 0.033 0.044 0.042 0.070 0.073
Household compostion, mean:
number of adults (age 18+) 2.612 2.615 2.626 2.585 2.679 2.653 2.942
number of children age 0 to 5 0.395 0.421 0.408 0.462 0.597 0.780 0.655
number of children age 6 to 12 0.524 0.527 0.479 0.547 0.668 0.905 0.927
number of children age 13 to 17 0.248 0.243 0.227 0.212 0.212 0.334 0.292
Age, proportion this category:
25 to 29 0.258 0.255 0.262 0.305 0.344 0.275 0.282
30 to 34 0.224 0.220 0.268 0.245 0.256 0.215 0.197
 35 to 39 0.223 0.228 0.199 0.209 0.181 0.167 0.196
40 to 44 0.155 0.162 0.144 0.126 0.109 0.175 0.164
45 to 50 0.140 0.136 0.127 0.115 0.111 0.169 0.161
Prefectural Unemployment Rates 1.27% 1.69% 2.36% 1.51% 1.02% 2.43% 1.08%
Number of Observations 286,173 2922 866 3133 1373 1304 3388




  24 
Variable Han Hui Korean Manchu Mongolian Uygur Zhuang
Labor force participation rate 0.763 0.721 0.676 0.721 0.718 0.648 0.836
Education level, proportion with:
primary or less 0.228 0.227 0.063 0.170 0.155 0.271 0.320
junior middle school 0.423 0.409 0.415 0.445 0.343 0.295 0.411
senior middle school 0.251 0.263 0.375 0.255 0.345 0.286 0.196
post secondary  0.098 0.101 0.146 0.130 0.157 0.148 0.073
Marital Status, proportion:
not married 0.056 0.060 0.119 0.064 0.039 0.108 0.086
married, spouse not present 0.071 0.076 0.079 0.038 0.039 0.036 0.071
Household compostion, mean:
number of adults (age 18+) 2.509 2.540 2.510 2.527 2.416 2.666 2.546
number of children age 0 to 5 0.222 0.249 0.158 0.216 0.259 0.392 0.264
number of children age 6 to 12 0.407 0.458 0.312 0.368 0.443 0.623 0.460
number of children age 13 to 17 0.220 0.234 0.253 0.253 0.248 0.238 0.250
Age, proportion this category:
25 to 29 0.211 0.212 0.162 0.202 0.270 0.268 0.246
30 to 34 0.227 0.205 0.198 0.228 0.198 0.247 0.237
 35 to 39 0.210 0.226 0.269 0.222 0.205 0.202 0.208
40 to 44 0.167 0.161 0.194 0.181 0.180 0.151 0.149
45 to 50 0.186 0.196 0.178 0.167 0.148 0.133 0.161
Prefectural Unemployment Rates 4.78% 4.52% 9.43% 8.08% 5.47% 3.92% 3.26%
Number of Observations 88,332 902 253 843 440 332 659















Han-Hui -0.0044 -0.0018 39.99% -0.0027 60.01%
Han-Korean -0.0011 -0.0051 480.23% 0.0040 -380.23%
Han-Manchu 0.0702 0.0944 134.56% -0.0243 -34.56%
Han-Mongolian 0.1008 0.1179 116.90% -0.0170 -16.90%
Han-Uygur 0.2076 0.2585 124.53% -0.0509 -24.53%












Han-Hui 0.0079 0.0009 10.91% 0.0070 89.09%
Han-Korean 0.0345 0.0698 202.54% -0.0353 -102.54%
Han-Manchu 0.0960 0.0956 99.61% 0.0004 0.39%
Han-Mongolian 0.1601 0.1635 102.11% -0.0034 -2.11%
Han-Uygur 0.2784 0.2742 98.49% 0.0042 1.51%












Han-Hui 0.0423 0.0473 111.91% -0.0050 -11.91%
Han-Korean 0.0870 0.1050 120.69% -0.0180 -20.69%
Han-Manchu 0.0417 0.0406 97.43% 0.0011 2.57%
Han-Mongolian 0.0447 0.0849 189.76% -0.0401 -89.76%
Han-Uygur 0.1153 0.1634 141.70% -0.0481 -41.70%
Han-Zhuang -0.0732 -0.0758 103.49% 0.0026 -3.49%
Decomposition of Differences in Chinese Women's Labor Force Participation Rates
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Variable Han Hui Korean Manchu Mongolian Uygur Zhuang
Labor force participation rate 0.988 0.983 0.980 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.976
Education level, proportion with:
primary or less 0.359 0.347 0.118 0.274 0.358 0.587 0.478
junior middle school 0.405 0.432 0.455 0.442 0.319 0.259 0.335
senior middle school 0.172 0.165 0.311 0.213 0.223 0.121 0.132
post secondary  0.064 0.056 0.116 0.071 0.100 0.034 0.055
Marital Status, proportion:
not married 0.129 0.118 0.075 0.084 0.087 0.130 0.114
married, spouse not present 0.105 0.097 0.071 0.074 0.046 0.110 0.066
Household compostion, mean:
number of adults (age 18+) 2.786 2.793 2.856 2.851 2.720 2.585 2.925
number of children age 0 to 5 0.390 0.409 0.425 0.404 0.497 0.770 0.775
number of children age 6 to 12 0.582 0.594 0.590 0.606 0.699 0.881 0.844
number of children age 13 to 17 0.242 0.244 0.273 0.251 0.260 0.262 0.277
Age, proportion this category:
25 to 29 0.284 0.271 0.276 0.281 0.271 0.255 0.281
30 to 34 0.213 0.220 0.237 0.208 0.191 0.211 0.229
 35 to 39 0.152 0.150 0.136 0.154 0.157 0.170 0.121
40 to 44 0.154 0.174 0.167 0.160 0.185 0.166 0.166
45 to 50 0.198 0.185 0.183 0.197 0.196 0.197 0.202
Prefectural Unemployment Rates 1.58% 1.67% 2.46% 2.29% 1.98% 1.15% 2.74%
Number of Observations 218,846 2984 785 1515 439 745 668
Appendix Table 1-A
Sample Statistics Urban Men Age 25-50 in 1982
 
 
  27 
Variable Han Hui Korean Manchu Mongolian Uygur Zhuang
Labor force participation rate 0.991 0.987 0.983 0.992 0.982 0.967 0.991
Education level, proportion with:
primary or less 0.252 0.242 0.094 0.248 0.182 0.378 0.409
junior middle school 0.404 0.449 0.428 0.430 0.356 0.286 0.370
senior middle school 0.261 0.247 0.375 0.248 0.347 0.228 0.192
post secondary  0.083 0.062 0.103 0.074 0.116 0.107 0.030
Marital Status, proportion:
not married 0.090 0.081 0.101 0.081 0.065 0.147 0.107
married, spouse not present 0.051 0.056 0.019 0.029 0.028 0.081 0.032
Household compostion, mean:
number of adults (age 18+) 2.604 2.599 2.662 2.595 2.592 2.556 2.976
number of children age 0 to 5 0.407 0.437 0.419 0.430 0.598 0.802 0.666
number of children age 6 to 12 0.492 0.517 0.479 0.522 0.678 0.729 0.850
number of children age 13 to 17 0.207 0.206 0.203 0.198 0.171 0.216 0.245
Age, proportion this category:
25 to 29 0.251 0.249 0.229 0.263 0.313 0.275 0.280
30 to 34 0.228 0.224 0.275 0.266 0.273 0.230 0.193
 35 to 39 0.222 0.220 0.227 0.219 0.215 0.174 0.211
40 to 44 0.159 0.162 0.139 0.131 0.101 0.171 0.170
45 to 50 0.141 0.145 0.130 0.121 0.099 0.150 0.147
Prefectural Unemployment Rates 1.27% 1.60% 2.32% 1.56% 1.02% 2.49% 1.08%
Number of Observations 282,720 2975 841 3408 1298 1296 2996
Appendix Table 1-B
Sample Statistics Urban Men Age 25-50 in 1990
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Variable Han Hui Korean Manchu Mongolian Uygur Zhuang
Labor force participation rate 0.962 0.943 0.879 0.961 0.951 0.928 0.971
Education level, proportion with:
primary or less 0.137 0.179 0.030 0.126 0.065 0.257 0.168
junior middle school 0.441 0.447 0.358 0.460 0.322 0.329 0.405
senior middle school 0.271 0.240 0.457 0.243 0.371 0.271 0.269
post secondary  0.150 0.134 0.155 0.171 0.241 0.144 0.158
Marital Status, proportion:
not married 0.090 0.106 0.185 0.083 0.070 0.116 0.122
married, spouse not present 0.053 0.057 0.052 0.031 0.022 0.021 0.073
Household compostion, mean:
number of adults (age 18+) 2.501 2.525 2.526 2.505 2.377 2.589 2.516
number of children age 0 to 5 0.226 0.250 0.125 0.199 0.206 0.459 0.281
number of children age 6 to 12 0.389 0.418 0.306 0.351 0.480 0.603 0.394
number of children age 13 to 17 0.206 0.216 0.237 0.261 0.201 0.199 0.213
Age, proportion this category:
25 to 29 0.198 0.209 0.151 0.168 0.238 0.250 0.227
30 to 34 0.226 0.219 0.211 0.242 0.211 0.257 0.255
 35 to 39 0.215 0.201 0.259 0.217 0.217 0.229 0.198
40 to 44 0.173 0.154 0.224 0.182 0.192 0.151 0.155
45 to 50 0.188 0.217 0.155 0.191 0.141 0.113 0.165
Prefectural Unemployment Rates 4.79% 4.64% 9.65% 8.25% 5.59% 3.88% 3.24%
Number of Observations 87,393 912 232 828 369 292 647
Appendix Table 1-C














Han-Hui 0.0051 0.0065 126.56% -0.0014 -26.56%
Han-Korean 0.0081 0.0137 169.29% -0.0056 -69.29%
Han-Manchu -0.0011 0.0021 -189.54% -0.0032 289.54%
Han-Mongolian -0.0009 0.0006 -62.86% -0.0015 162.86%
Han-Uygur -0.0002 0.0413 -18011.43% -0.0416 18111.43%












Han-Hui 0.0038 0.0037 97.22% 0.0001 2.78%
Han-Korean 0.0076 0.0013 17.68% 0.0063 82.32%
Han-Manchu -0.0011 -0.0009 80.22% -0.0002 19.78%
Han-Mongolian 0.0087 0.0140 161.02% -0.0053 -61.02%
Han-Uygur 0.0241 0.0253 105.01% -0.0012 -5.01%












Han-Hui 0.0186 0.0163 88.04% 0.0022 11.96%
Han-Korean 0.0822 0.1122 136.37% -0.0299 -36.37%
Han-Manchu 0.0002 -0.0054 -2720.87% 0.0057 2820.87%
Han-Mongolian 0.0103 0.0043 41.78% 0.0060 58.22%
Han-Uygur 0.0335 0.1039 310.46% -0.0704 -210.46%
Han-Zhuang -0.0091 -0.0054 60.02% -0.0036 39.98%
Note:
1982 Logit for Mongolian fails chi-squared test
2000 Logits for Zhuang and Koreans fail chi-squared tests
Decomposition of Differences in Chinese Men's Labor Force Participation Rates
Urban Men Age 25-50
Appendix Table 2
 
 
 
  30